Research On Convergence Of Interest Effect And Entrenchment Effect Of Mixed-Ownership Reform

In 2017,the government reported that "deepen the reform of mixed ownership and take substantive steps in specific fields".This paper focuses on Mixed Ownership Reform,and researches deeply into the convergence of interest effects and entrenchment effects.On the one hand,it provides policy suggestions for enterprises and stakeholders participating in the reform through empirical analysis,which is conducive to achieving greater benefits of enterprises in the reform.On the other hand,not only does it encourage state-owned enterprises to actively regulate their own behaviors and to improve management capacity,but also helps regulators to improve the regulatory assessment system.In this paper,the panel VAR model was used to study the influence of mixed ownership reform on information disclosure quality.Then taking it as an intermediary variable,this paper analyzes the benefit convergence of interest effects and entrenchment effects of reform,and variance decomposition is used to analyze the influence level of each variable.On the other hand,this paper selects 26 listed state-owned enterprises to study the influence of Employee Stock Ownership Plan.This paper draws the following conclusions.Firstly,the equity concentration level and quality of information disclosure of listed state-owned enterprises show a negative correlation,but equity checks and balances executives shareholding and rising executive pay are unable to improve the quality of information disclosure.In addition,the reform has weakened the equity concentration,strengthened the moat defensive effect,improve the executive shareholding,and these measures can reduce the agency costs of state-owned enterprises,weaken the moat defensive effect and enhance interest convergence.Secondly,convergence effect and trenches defense effect coexist.The reform changes the information disclosure quality,equity structure and incentive system,and draw lessons from the market-oriented management model,and these effects are not unidirectional.Event study of employee stock ownership plan proves that the effect is limited because of hot money and implementation problems of this plan.