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Research On The Tunneling Behavior Of Major Shareholders Under The Equity Financing Mode

Posted on:2020-08-20Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330623450280Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Among the various refinancing methods in China's capital market,listed companies will be more inclined to use the method of equity refinancing to raise funds needed for the company's development process.However,the phenomenon of short-selling listed companies in China's major shareholders has become more frequent,and the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders have also suffered serious losses.Therefore,studying the short-selling behavior of major shareholders under the equity financing method has both theoretical and practical significance.The case company selected by this article has two equity financings in 2015,and the major shareholder is also the actual controller of the company.With the equity financing,the company is short-selled,and the funds raised are transferred to other companies under its control or Transfer to your own private account.This paper analyzes the behavior and characteristics of Equity Airline Equity Financing in detail,studies the short-selling path and related economic consequences,and finally analyzes the reasons and countermeasures of the use of equity financing for large shareholders.The innovation of this paper is:from the perspective of the private benefits of control,the internal relationship between the large shareholders and the equity financing is deeply analyzed.In addition,the maj or shareholders do not need to collude with the executives,but directly realize the short-selling by themselves.This paper also enriches the research on the capital occupation behavior in the short-selling mode.
Keywords/Search Tags:Major shareholder, Tunneling, Equity financing, Transfer modes
PDF Full Text Request
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