The Research On The Effects Of Corporate Governance And External Regulation On The Risk-taking Behavior Of Listed Commercial Banks In China

As an industry with risks,how to manage its own risks is a key issue that all commercial banks must consider.If the risks assumed by commercial banks are beyond their own tolerance,they are prone to bankruptcy risks,which will lead to chain systemic risks and extremely high government salvage costs.After the US banking crisis in 2007-2009,the issue of bank risk-taking behavior began to receive widespread attention in the academic community.In the related research on this issue,the corporate governance mechanism and external supervision mechanism within the bank have always been the research hotspots.Under the background of new and old kinetic energy conversion stage,frequent bank risk events and a new round of financial reform,this research is highly significant for exploring bank risk-taking behavior in terms of bank's governance structure and external supervision mechanisms.This paper firstly combs the theories of risk-taking behavior of commercial banks,internal corporate governance and external supervision mechanisms,and then introduces some specific indicators analyzing the current situation of some current listed commercial banks in China in terms of risk-taking ability,corporate governance and the status of external supervision based on the operation of them in recent years.On the basis of theoretical analysis and current situation investigation,the annual report data of 16 A-share listed banks in China as an empirical sample were selected and relevant indicators were selected for empirical analysis.The empirical results show that there is a non-linear "U" relationship between equity concentration and bank risk taking;the occupation of government-owned equity is positively related to bank risk taking;the participation of foreign shareholders and risk-taking are positively correlated with the bank's risk-taking level;there is an obviously negative correlation between bank's risktaking behavior and the gender diversity of board members,outside director's proportion and the board of supervisors' number;the executive compensation are inversely proportional to the bank's risk-taking,but the executive shareholding's impact on risk taking is not obvious;the regulation of capital adequacy ratio has a significant effect on reducing risk taking behavior of banks;the regulation of provision coverage can also effectively reduce risk-taking behavior of banks;the impact of the regulation of leverage ratio and liquidity indicators on bank risk taking is not yet obvious.Finally,this paper proposes ways to improve the risk-taking of banks in terms of ownership structure,board of directors,executive compensation and external supervision: optimizing the shareholding structure and improving shareholders' quality to protect all shareholders' interests;promoting the independent director's role;setting the right size and composition of the board of directors and supervisors;optimizing the executive compensation system and linking risk-taking with compensation;optimizing the allocation of external regulatory resources to improve the efficiency of supervision.