Research On Risk Changes Of Different Types Of Commercial Banks In China Under The Background Of Deposit Insurance System

Since May 1,2015,the deposit insurance system has been officially implemented in China,marking the transformation of China's commercial banks from invisible deposit insurance to explicit deposit insurance.The deposit insurance system directly transfers the risk of the bank's debt-side run-off,which has a great impact on the commercial bank's asset-side loan business,wealth management business,depositors' confidence and supervision of commercial banks,and regulatory authorities' regulatory priorities.China has implemented a deposit insurance system for three years.Before 2015,the relevant literature lacked empirical data from China.It could only theoretically analyze the impact of the deposit insurance system on commercial banks,regulatory authorities,and the public,or it could only use foreign data to analyze deposit insurance.The influence of the system and suggestions on the system construction in China are less studied,and the actual impact of the deposit insurance system received by commercial banks in China is less.In addition,in the empirical papers that study the situation in China,the bank classification and risk measurement are relatively simple,and the heterogeneity impact of banks is not considered.This paper selects NPL and Z-score as the proxy variables of commercial bank risk measurement respectively.It examines the impact of deposit insurance system on commercial banks from the loan side and the profit side respectively,and uses the “counterfactual” analysis method to exclude the influence of other factors on commercial banks.Using the quasi-natural experiments stipulated in the implementation of the deposit insurance system,select 35 foreign-funded commercial banks with branches in China as the control group,fit the situation of domestic commercial banks,eliminate the influence of other factors on China's commercial banks,and do business banks.The classification of the scale and loan structure,and the impact of the deposit insurance system on China's commercial banks.It is found that the moral hazard of the bank brought about by the deposit insurance system is more obvious in the national joint-stock commercial banks,but the negative impact of this moral hazard has improved in the long run.This phenomenon is closely related to the bank's loan structure.The impact on the profitability of small and medium-sized banks is even greater,leading to a significant increase in the survival pressure of small and medium-sized banks.