| Chinese securities market introduced the margin financing and securities trading mechanism in 2010,which is considered to be a maj or step forward in stabilizing the stock market.Recent scholars' research found that the short selling mechanism can not only stabilize the stock market,but also generate external governance effects on the company.As a high-efficiency and low-cost refinancing method,private placement has been a research hotspot of Chinese scholars since the official launch of China's capital market in 2006,especially the transfer of interests of major shareholders in the process of private placement.The phenomenon of the interests of small and medium shareholders needs to be governed.Therefore,this paper mainly studies the short selling mechanism to suppress the interest transfer behavior of large shareholders after private placement.Since the pilot of China's short selling mechanism is gradually carried out,a natural quasi-natural experiment is formed.This paper uses the double difference model to adopt the data of A-share listed companies in China and Shenzhen and Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2007-2016.The external governance effect of the empty mechanism on the transfer behavior of the interests of maj or shareholders.The research results show that the short selling mechanism can restrain the large shareholders' interest transfer behavior after the private placement,and reduce the cash dividend distribution,the related transaction amount and the major shareholder reduction behavior of the maj or shareholders after the private placement.At the same time,the study also found that for companies with high equity concentration,the short-selling mechanism has a more significant inhibitory effect on the transmission of large shareholders' interests and short-selling investors can also play a synergistic role with institutional investors to jointly exert external governance effects on the interests of large shareholders. |
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