Research On The Function Mechanism And Channel Of CEO Reputation To Alleviate The Financing Constraint Of Listed Private Enterprises

Since the 19 th national congress of the communist party of China(CPC),the topic of strengthening the financial services to the real economy to solve the "unbalanced and insufficient" problem of China’s economic development has emerged one after another.At present,the most important reason restricting the development of the real economy lies in the difficulty and high cost of financing.As an important part of the real economy,private economy is playing an increasingly important role in social and economic life as the rapid development of the economy grows into an important driving force for economic growth,an effective channel to relieve employment pressure and an important force to activate the market.However,at the same time of rapid development,private economy also faces many external constraints,including market access,governance structure and property rights protection.Among them,financing constraints are the most prominent and long-term obstacle to its sound development.It has been found that the financing constraints of private enterprises will bring all kinds of negative effects to enterprises and adversely hinder their long-term development.Therefore,in the period of economic transformation,how to relieve the external financing constraints of private enterprises has become an urgent problem to be solved.Based on the theory of asymmetric information and reputation theory,selection of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed private enterprises in 2007-2017 as sample,media reports as CEO reputation proxy variables,signaling game model and reputation through reputation KMRW game model to study the CEO reputation on the role of the private listed companies financing constraints,further analyzes the CEO reputation relief channels of financing constraints.The results show that :(1)CEO reputation can effectively relieve the financing constraints of private enterprises.This means that the reputation of CEO can play a signaling role in the external financing market,which can alleviate the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders,and thus alleviate the financing constraints.(2)The effective mechanism of CEO reputation to alleviate financing constraints of enterprises lies in that it promotes enterprises with financing constraints to obtain more bank loans and commercial credit to alleviate financing difficulties;(3)Based on the heterogeneity of the CEO reputation on the point of view of the role of different scale,the industry of private enterprises,found that CEO reputation in the role of small and medium-sized enterprises play a more and more role in technology-intensive industry,namely the CEO reputation can help small and medium-sized enterprises,technology intensive enterprises get more bank loans and commercial credit,alleviate their financing constraints.These results show that when China’s external system is insufficient to support the development of private enterprises,private enterprises can set up a reputation mechanism to ease their financing constraints,obtain more bank loans and commercial credit financing,promote their own development,and reduce the inhibiting effect of imperfect institutional environment on their development.