Comparison Of Executive Compensation And Active Resignation

Income distribution and social equity issues have been hot topics of concern.Following the state-owned enterprise salary restriction order,the salaries of corporate executives are still rising,and the salary gap is increasing year by year.Although in2018,18 inter-ministerial joint member units such as the Ministry of Civil Affairs,the Ministry of Finance,and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security held a meeting to deepen the reform of the income distribution system,and issued the intent of "Key Work Arrangements for the 2018 Income Distribution Field(Consultation Draft)" Suppressing this trend,but the annual report data of listed companies in 2018 shows that the total compensation of executives of more than 3,500 listed companies in the A-share market is more than 100 million yuan,and the lowest is less than500,000 yuan.The difference contrast will inevitably lead to a psychological gap among executives.Driven by this psychological gap,executives are likely to voluntarily resign.However,when conducting research on salary comparison,we have not been able to distinguish between the two concepts of salary and salary gap.This article uses the contract theory of reference point to prove that salary comparison does exist,and then uses empirical research on listed company data to prove that comparison of executive compensation is indeed the reason for executives to voluntarily resign,and when the cost of active resignation is too high,comparison of executive compensation will also lead executives to different performance methods(consummate performance and perfunctory performance).This article starts from the contract theory of reference point and fairness theory,and first uses the overall idea of the reference point contract theory and fairness theory to try to explain the rationality of comparison formation.From the perspective of executive compensation and executive behavior,it analyzes the relationship between comparison of executive compensation and the active resignation.Due to the unique reference point factor in the contract theory of reference point,which is to explore from the spatial dimension,under the effect of regional salary reference point,the compensation of executives of listed companies is lower than the average salary ofexecutives of listed companies in the region The influence of the average salary of executives of listed companies in the region on the relationship between comparison of executive compensation and active resignation;and then consider the role of reference point factors in the nature of property rights in the contract theory of reference point,that is,consider the nature of property rights The reference point effect explores the impact of the relationship between non-state-owned listed companies and state-owned listed companies on executive compensation comparisons and executive turnover.Further research is combined with the contract theory of reference point in the contractual contractual performance method of the contracting parties,that is,to form perfunctory performance or perfect performance,and to explore the economic consequences of the company's executive pay comparison.Therefore,this article selects China A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2018 as a sample,and studies the empirical relationship between comparison of executive compensation and active resignation from the perspective of executives' psychological behavior characteristics.The study found that there is a significant correlation between comparison of executive compensation and active resignation.Integrate the reference point factor and contract relationship in the contract theory of reference point to expand.Firstly,considering the reference point factors,through group regression analysis,it was found that in the regional salary practice standards,compared with the average salary of listed company executives,the executive compensation of listed companies was lower than that of the region.The average salary of executives of listed companies has a reference point effect on the benchmarks of executive compensation of Chinese companies,that is,the greater the motivation of executives to compare salary,the more obvious the method of their active departure is;and according to the factors of reference points in the difference in the nature of property rights.In terms of function,it is obtained through group regression that under the reference point of property rights,compared with state-owned listed companies,comparison of executive compensation is more significant in promoting non-state-owned listed companies to voluntarily resign.In addition,considering another factor in the contract theory of reference point,which isthe performance method in the contract relationship,the further analysis of the economic consequences of executive pay comparisons,and found that executive pay comparisons will lead to the performance of the contract relationship in the reference point contract theory.Different methods,that is,the difference between perfunctory performance or consummate performance.Therefore,the research in this article has always incorporated the contract theory of reference point into the basic framework of the full-text analysis,and has expanded the scope of the contract theory of reference point to a certain extent.At the same time,the above evidence shows comparison of executive compensation is an important incentive for executives to take the initiative to leave.The main contributions of this article are mainly reflected in the following:(1)This article uses the contract theory of reference point to verify the existence of salary comparison,and the follow-up study of executive compensation comparison,active resignation,and performance methods are to further verify salary comparison.The study started,opening a research window for the field of executive compensation comparison,and further proved that compensation comparison is worth studying.(2)In exploring the issue of active resignation,starting from a new line of thought,investigating the psychological motivations and their action paths that may lead to the active departure of executives,and enriching the research on the causes and consequences of active resignation.(3)Based on the contract theory of reference point in behavioral economics,this article explores the empirical relationship between comparison of executive compensation and active resignation,deepens the development of the contract theory of reference point,and expands the theoretical perspective of executive compensation incentives.This paper studies the above multiple relationships into a framework for analysis,and analyzes from the perspective of the reference point effect of the contract theory of reference point and the contractual relationship performance method.It expands the existing research and fills the gap to a certain extent.