Research On The Impact Of Management Power Of Listed Companies In Manufacturing Industry On Cash Dividend Policy

China's economic development has entered a new normal,and the supply-side reform has been comprehensively promoted.This has made the survival and development of the manufacturing enterprises of the national economy full of opportunities and challenges.As one of the three major financial decisions,the cash dividend policy directly affects the survival and development of the company.However,the phenomenon of low faction and non-distribution has seriously affected the healthy development of the company and damaged the interests of shareholders.According to agency theory and management power theory,reasonable management power can encourage management to formulate and implement scientific and effective financial decisions.However,as management power increases,management will use power to intervene in corporate financial decisions for rent-seeking.This has seriously affected the company's survival and healthy development.Based on this,this thesis examines the relationship between the management power of the manufacturing company and the cash dividend policy.Under the consideration of the nature of property rights and the macroeconomic situation,this thesis further explores the influence of the power constraint mechanism at the corporate governance level.The purpose of this thesis is to explore the reasons for the current situation of the distribution of cash dividends of manufacturing companies from the perspective of management power,and to provide a theoretical basis for optimizing the cash dividend policy of manufacturing companies from the perspective of strengthening the internal and external power constraint mechanism.This thesis firstly reviews the status quo of literature research at home and abroad,defines management power and related concepts.On this basis,from the perspective of management power theory,it identifies the formation of management power and summarizes the management power measurement method to form the management of this thesis.Power evaluation system.Then,the status quo of the cash dividend policy of listed companies in the manufacturing industry is analyzed from three aspects,and the cash dividend distribution of other industries is compared with the parameter test.The problems of the cash dividend distribution of listed companies in the manufacturing industry are analyzed and the reasons are analyzed.In the two aspects of internal and external powers,six sub-dimension indicators including two roles,board size,and general education background were constructed.The principal component analysis method was used to construct a comprehensive index of management power.Finally,Logit and Tobit regression models were used to test The influence of the management power of manufacturing companies on the cash dividend policy,as well as the adjustment of the relationship between the nature of different property rights,macroeconomic conditions,and power constraints,and the test of robustness.This thesis selects the 2013-2017 financial data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing listed companies as a sample,and establishes an empirical model for the sample data to explore the impact of management power on the cash dividend policy.The study found that:(1)the expansion of management power will inhibit the distribution of cash dividends,in which the structural power of management power and the owner's power play a major role in the suppression of cash dividends,but have no significant impact on the cash dividend payment propensity;(2)Compared with private enterprises,the management power of state-owned listed companies has a more significant effect on the suppression of cash dividends;(3)the better the macroeconomic situation,the stronger the suppression of the management rights of manufacturing companies on cash dividends;(4)In the power constraint mechanism,the controlling of major shareholders can effectively restrict the management's power rent-seeking behavior in the cash dividend distribution decision,and weaken the restraining effect of management power on the cash dividend distribution level,while institutional investors hold shares and marketize.The process has not yet been able to effectively restrict management's power rent-seeking behavior.The above findings not only enriched the literature on management power and cash dividend policy,but also provided feasible ideas and methods for the listed companies to optimize the cash dividend distribution policy.