Analysis On The Mechanism Of Credit Default Risk Under The Deleveraging Policy

The development of bond market is of great strategic significance to broaden the direct financing channels of enterprises and maintain the overall stability of the financial market in China.With the optimization and upgrading of China's financial structure and the active encouragement of relevant national policies,China's credit bond market has achieved rapid development and become an important direct financing channel for enterprises.However,the default events in the credit bond market also occur frequently,which brings great experience to investors.In the future,the maturity scale of the bond issuing enterprises in China will continue to expand,the debt burden of the enterprises will continue to increase,the profit level will gradually decline,and the operation pressure will gradually increase.Therefore,there will be a high default risk in the credit bond market in China in the future,and the market investors need to pay close attention to the situation of the credit bond market risk.Frequent credit default events affect the stable development of China's bond market.It is of great significance for the development of China's bond market to fully understand the development of China's bond market and the causes of credit default.Using the data of China's bond market as of the end of June 2019,based on the unique perspective of the impact of deleveraging policy,this paper summarizes the overall situation of credit bond default and the characteristics of credit bond default in recent years,and analyzes the impact of deleveraging policy on credit bond default from the perspective of macroeconomic factors such as deleveraging policy and micro characteristics such as financial indicators of debt issuing enterprises.In this paper,logit regression is used to get the evaluation model of default probability of issuing enterprises.Using the method of tendency score matching and double difference,the relationship between deleveraging policy,the level of leverage ratio,the limitation of corporate financing,the structure of corporate debt and the default of corporate credit debt is explored.In this paper,we find that the deleveraging policy can reduce the overall leverage level of enterprises to a certain extent,but during the implementation of the deleveraging policy,some enterprises also have the phenomenon of adding leverage.Deleveraging policy has a positive correlation with the probability of default of enterprises in 2017 and 2018,and a negative correlation in 2019.This paper believes that the reason for this phenomenon is that when the deleveraging policy was first introduced,the market was impacted to some extent,bond issuers had not yet adapted to the policy changes,financing efficiency was reduced,and the probability of default was increased.But in a long-term process,the implementation of the deleveraging policy makes the bonds with higher grade,greater growth of issuers and higher repayment ability more popular,and the bond market more rational,thus reducing the enterprise default rate.This is consistent with the goal of establishing an effective market mechanism,maintaining the leverage ratio at a reasonable level,and reducing the probability of default.This paper finds that the implementation of deleveraging policy will gradually reduce the impact of high leverage on default by adding the interaction term of deleveraging policy dummy variable and enterprise leverage level grouping in the model.Under the environment of deleveraging policy,social liquidity is becoming tighter,corporate financing is more difficult,some companies fail to issue or cancel the issuance of credit bonds,and the number of unsuccessful bonds is increasing.In this paper,by adding the interaction term of deleveraging policy and financing limited virtual variables into the model,we find that financing Limited will increase the probability of enterprise default,but deleveraging policy will reduce the probability of financing limited to enterprise default.The current situation that the debt structure of Chinese enterprises is dominated by short-term debt will increase the probability of default of credit debt in China,but the deleveraging policy will reduce the impact of the high proportion of shortterm debt on default.The empirical results are consistent with the implementation goals of China's deleveraging policy,which shows that deleveraging policy has positive significance in optimizing the debt structure of enterprises and reducing the default of enterprises.