Has The E-commerce Platform "choose One Out Of Two" Lowered Social Welfare?

With the rise of the development of Internet technology and platform business model,our country has poured into a large number of excellent platform for enterprises,these enterprises in the e-commerce,instant messaging,search engines,web about cars,and many other industries,and with the further development of the platform,the industry revealed a high degree of concentration of business model,the main market share basic dominated by less several large platform of enterprise,such as Alibaba e-commerce market and Jingdong,Tencent's instant messaging market,Baidu search engine market,360 and so on.By virtue of their high market shares,these enterprises have influenced the trend of the market and manipulated the market price,gradually showing many characteristics of monopoly and oligopoly.In recent years,in order to further achieve the goal of increasing market share and suppressing competitors,large platform enterprises have forced merchants on their respective platforms to choose between different platforms.In other words,merchants are only allowed to provide products and services on one platform,depriving merchants of the right to choose platforms freely.Due to the special market environment in China,merchants are excessively dependent on platform channels.Therefore,under the unreasonable requirements of platform,merchants even face the dilemma of "no choice".This kind of "exclusive dealing" phenomenon is more common in the electronic commerce platform,so the main research content of this article is based on the current situation of the development of China's e-commerce platform,combined with the "exclusive dealing" phenomenon,in the hotelling model on the basis of whether businesses through e-commerce platforms has the power to choose its own platform,built a consumer,platform,merchants tripartite game model,analyzes the phenomenon of "exclusive dealing" of consumer utility,and utility of the merchants,the effects of the income.Through the research,it is found that the "exclusive dealing" phenomenon has no effect on the utility of single attribution consumers and reduces the utility of multiple attribution consumers.It has no effect on the utility of single-owned businesses and reduces the utility of multi-owned businesses.In addition,although the "exclusive dealing" is initiated by the platform,under the market equilibrium state,the "exclusive dealing" reduces the income of the platform.Due to insufficient competition among e-commerce platforms in China,the "exclusive dealing" phenomenon further enhances the welfare of large platforms and damages the welfare of small platforms in the real economic life.