Evolutionary Research Of The Lemon's Problem Of E-commerce Platform Based On Public Goods Game

The e-commerce platform digitizes the traditional business processes,breaks through the constraints of time and space,and creates more profit opportunities for enterprises.With the gradual rise of e-commerce platforms,the traditional enterprise network is constantly transforming into a platform network,and the new lemon's problem has caused widespread social concern.The lemon's problem of the e-commerce platform is manifested in the fact that e-commerce uses information overload,information speculation,and information fraud to infringe consumers.Therefore,electronic commerce law was promulgated and implemented accordingly.However,the latest statistics show that the problem of infringement due to information asymmetry remains high.Therefore,on the basis of administrative governance,it is still necessary to perfect the platform governance in combination with the advantages of the market.The reputation mechanism is the basis for the market to govern the e-commerce platform.Based on the public goods characteristics of the platform reputation,this article takes the public goods game as the basis of the game model,and takes individual e-commerce as the player.The evolution analysis of the e-commerce platform is dedicated to improving the lemon's problem in equilibrium.First,the literature analysis method is used to collate relevant domestic and foreign literature,compare the advantages and disadvantages of various mechanisms to solve the public goods dilemma,and propose a new mechanism combining punishment and fairness in light of the actual background of e-commerce platforms.Secondly,use the game theory to analyze the evolution of the platform and obtain the game equilibrium.The game equilibrium is embodied in the equilibrium of the platform internal evolution,the stabilization of the platform evolution,and the dynamic equilibrium of the multiple platform evolution.Finally,the system simulation method is used to present the equilibrium results.By adjusting the key parameters and observing the changes in equilibrium,we can obtain the role played by each parameter,and then propose corresponding countermeasures for each parameter to improve the lemon's problem.This paper analyzes the evolution of the lemon's problem on e-commerce platform,and concludes that different evolution mechanisms need to be adopted in different evolution stages.When the platform is small,individuals within the platform can easily form a decision group through negotiation,and then use the decision group as a decision unit to achieve a fully cooperation.When the platform is large,individual e-commerce needs to be used as a decision unit,and the equilibrium is that cooperators and free riders coexist.Furthermore,the influence of parameters on equilibrium shows that the application of punishment mechanism and fairness preference is indispensable for platform governance.Reducing the difficulty of punishing and increasing the importance of fairness are important measures to improve the lemon's problem of e-commerce platforms.This paper studies the evolutionary process of the platform,analyzes the lemon's problem of evolutionary equilibrium,and proposes corresponding solutions.In terms of theory,this paper proposes a new mechanism to solve the public goods dilemma and enriches the theory of public goods.In terms of reality,the research results of this paper have important reference significance for the governance of the platform.