Research On The Governance Of Inefficient Investments By Liabilities Financing Of State-owned Listed Companies

The outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 has brought a very far-reaching impact on the development of many enterprises in China.Let the investment efficiency of Chinese enterprises greatly reduce.Up to now,this kind of inefficient investment is still emerging in endlessly.How to realize the best allocation of the limited resources,such as avoiding the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises,these problems are worthy of in-depth exploration and analysis,because it has a direct relationship with the development of enterprises and the improvement of enterprise value in China.The direction of investment and capital flow is closely related,while financing is related to capital inflow.Only when enterprises have capital inflow can they have capital outflow.They are closely related.However,at present,there are many domestic enterprises have a very serious problem of equity financing preference.Previous studies on the relationship between investment and financing of enterprises have focused on the inefficient investment under this equity preference,ignoring the possible investment deviation.Debt is a very important part of corporate financing channels.Moreover,debt is closely related to inefficient investment.At the same time,at this stage,state-owned enterprises are actively carrying out enterprise reform.In this context,the debt financing level of state-owned listed enterprises has also changed significantly,and the impact on inefficient investment is not the same as before.This paper takes the state-owned listed enterprises as the specific research and analysis object.This paper makes a comprehensive study and analysis of the impact of debt financing on the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises,and discusses the ways to optimize the investment efficiency of state-owned listed enterprises according to the research results.In this paper,during the period of 2015-2018,a Taking the relevant investment data of state-owned listed companies as the specific research object,the paper obtains the inefficient investment situation of state-owned listed companies in China through the inefficient investment regression model,and then establishes the regression model from the three dimensions of total debt financing,debt maturity difference and debt source difference respectively,and analyzes the inefficient investment brought by them to state-owned listed companies in turn Influence.According to the research and analysis,this paper draws the following conclusions:(1)at present,the inefficient investment of state-owned listed companies is still not optimistic,and both over investment and under investment occur;(2)the debt financing of state-owned listed companies can restrain over investment as a whole,and play the role of contingent governance of debt financing.Specifically,from the perspective of debt maturity,short-term debt can inhibit over investment of state-owned listed companies,but it is not obvious;from the perspective of source,bank loans can inhibit over investment of state-owned listed companies to a certain extent,but the effect is not very obvious,and commercial credit can inhibit over investment of state-owned listed companies to play a governance role due to strong hard constraints Use.(2)In general,debt financing of state-owned listed companies will promote the emergence of insufficient investment,and the financing binding force is strong.From the perspective of debt maturity,short-term debt can play a role of financing governance,which can effectively alleviate the pressure of state-owned listed enterprises' investment shortage,while long-term debt can obviously promote the investment of enterprises,and long-term debt has a very strong binding force on the investment behavior of listed enterprises;from the perspective of debt source,bank loans and commercial credit are very important to Under investment of state-owned listed companies can promote,but the effect of bank loans on under investment is not significant.Finally,this paper puts forward specific policy suggestions and programs based on the results of empirical analysis:(1)the state-owned listed enterprises must make full use of debt instruments and leverage utility,establish a more scientific and reasonable capital structure,and at the same time,reasonably select liabilities with different maturities,optimize and adjust the source composition of liabilities,and make full use of the commercial credit Governance.(2)Government departments should broaden the financing channels of state-owned listed companies,further develop the bond market,and formulate relevant legal systems to effectively protect the principal position of creditors,especially bank creditors;(3)banks should actively introduce diversified subjects,conduct all-round supervision and control on the loan behavior of state-owned listed enterprises,so that creditors have the governance over enterprises Give full play to its role.