Research On The Influence Of Corporate Governance Structure On The Disclosure Of Internal Control Deficiences

After the financial fraud of Enron,WorldCom and China Aviation Oil,a series of policy guidelines on internal control have been issued at home and abroad,including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act issued by the United States in 2002,the Basic Standards of Enterprise Internal Control issued jointly by the five ministries and commissions in 2008,and the Enterprise in 2010.Guidelines for internal control.In 2014,the domestic A-share listed companies on the main board entered the stage of comprehensive mandatory disclosure,and the internal control system of listed companies initially took shape.Nevertheless,in the past two years,there are still huge ticket incidents caused by the failure of internal control mechanism,such as PricewaterhouseCoopers and Pudong Development Bank.The study of internal control defects has become the focus of attention of experts and scholars at home and abroad.However,more and more literatures are about the study of internal control evaluation.Research on the impact of internal control defects on corporate governance structure.Firstly,this paper analyzes the disclosure situation and existing problems of internal control defects in China.Based on the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,signaling theory and management power theory,this paper combs the research results and contradictions at home and abroad,and takes the audit quality,the integration of two jobs,and the monopoly of one share as the basis.The characteristics of industrial governance focus on research.Empirically,this paper chooses the disclosure information of internal control of listed A-share companies on the main board from 2014 to 2017 under the principle of mandatory disclosure as the research object,and examines the impact of corporate governance structure on the disclosure of internal control defects by designing variables and constructing models.The results show that large proportion of independent directors and the nature of the first largest shareholder are more likely to disclose the internal control defects,while the enterprises with "two functions" of chairman and general manager and high proportion of shares of the first largest shareholder are less likely to disclose the information of internal control defects.Based on the above theoretical and empirical analysis results,this paper puts forward a series of feasible suggestions from the aspects of improving corporate governance structure,improving the effectiveness of external supervision,optimizing the incentive mechanism of enterprises,and strengthening the construction of internal control system,in order to improve the objectivity and fairness of internal control flaws information disclosure of Listed Companies in China.Based on the above theoretical and empirical analysis results,this paper puts forward a series of feasible suggestions from the aspects of improving corporate governance structure,improving the effectiveness of external supervision,optimizing the incentive mechanism of enterprises,and strengthening the construction of internal control system,in order to improve the objectivity and fairness of internal control flaws information disclosure of Listed Companies in China.