The Impact Of Listed Companies' Shareholding Structure On Related Party M&A Performance

Most of the listed companies in China are reformed and listed by state-owned enterprises.Therefore,the shareholding structure of China capital market is characterized by a majority of state-owned shares and a high concentration of equity.As an emerging market economy country,China capital market has not really reached the state of marketization and economization.In addition,the special listing system in the early stage of the share reform has left many historical problems and because of the special institutional background,market economic environment and ownership structure,the number of related party M&A has reached almost half of all M&A in China,occupying a very important position in the capital market.The controlling shareholder and director of the related party of the listed company's M&A activities constitute the key part of the company's shareholding structure.The shareholding structure determines the composition of the company's board of directors,the board of supervisors,the management and their relationship,and then determines the corporate governance behavior and efficiency,directly affecting whether the company can make scientific and reasonable M&A decisions and has an important impact on the M&A performance of listed companies.Therefore,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the relationship between shareholding structure and related party M&A performance.In this context,firstly,this paper combs and analyzes the related concepts,basic theories and domestic and foreign research results of shareholding structure and related party M&A performance and then analyzes the relationship between the listed company's shareholding structure and the related party M&A performance andproposes research hypotheses.In order to prove the research hypothesis,this paper takes 78 listed companies that have successfully implemented related mergers and acquisitions in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from January 1,2015 to December 31,2015 as the research samples.Firstly,the financial index method is used to construct the listed company and the factor analysis method is used to calculate the performance of the listed company's related party M&A in the current year,the first two years and the second two years.Then the multiple linear regression model is used to analyze the impact of the listed company's shareholding structure on the related M&A performance.The empirical results show that:(1)The nature of the actual controller of the listed company has a significant negative correlation with the performance of the related mergers and acquisitions.The listed company is state-controlled and the performance of related party M&A is lower;(2)The listed company's equity concentration and related party M&A performance showed a significant positive correlation only in the first phase after the merger.The supporting behavior of the major shareholder has a poor effect on the company's performance improvement;(3)There is no significant relationship between equity balance and related party M&A performance in all phases of M&A;(4)The shareholding ratio of listed executives is negatively correlated with the performance of related party M&A.The impact of the listed company's shareholding structure on the performance of related party M&A requires the government to strengthen supervision and improve relevant laws and regulations.The listed companies need to further optimize the shareholding structure,improve governance efficiency,strengthen internal M&A supervision,to standardize the M&A behavior of listed companies and enhance the level of performance of M&A with related party.