Institutional Investors Heterogeneity And Accounting Information Quality

In the capital market,high-quality accounting information can not only effectively alleviate information asymmetry between the company and investors,but also improve the company's investment and financing efficiency.In addition,it can also have an important impact on the effective allocation of securities market resources and macroeconomic policies..However,the quality of accounting information in China's capital market is not optimistic,and the problem of distorted accounting information by listed companies has become a serious problem in the capital market.Therefore,how to improve the quality of accounting information of listed companies has become one of the hot topics in the academic and practical circles.Institutional investors have the advantages of shareholding scale,professional talents,market information,etc.,which not only has the ability and willingness to supervise corporate management,but also can play shareholder activism in corporate governance practices.Therefore,it can be predicted that institutional investors can improve the company accounting information quality.At the same time,with the increase in the size and type of institutional investors,the willingness and ability of different institutional investors to participate in corporate governance and play a supervisory role have been different.This article divides institutional investors into pressure-resistant institutional investors and pressure-sensitive institutional investors according to whether they have business relationships with investment companies.Compared with pressure-sensitive institutional investors,pressure-resistant institutional investors will more actively participate in corporate governance and improve the quality of corporate accounting information.This article empirically examines the relationship between the heterogeneity of institutional investors and institutional investors and the quality of accounting information and at the same time explores whether the quality of internal control plays a mediating effect between pressure-resistant institutional investment and the quality of accounting information.The empirical results show that: First,the institutional investor's shareholding ratio is significantly negatively correlated with the company's accrued earnings,indicating that institutional investors can suppress corporate earnings management and improve the quality of corporate accounting information;further considering the heterogeneity of institutional investors and the pressure resistance type Institutional investors have a significant promotion effect on the quality of corporate accounting information,while the relationship between pressure-sensitive institutional investors and the quality of accounting information of listed companies is no longer significant.Second,both the stepwise regression method and the Sobel test method have found that the quality of internal controlplays a mediating effect in the relationship between the two,indicating that pressure-resistant institutional investors can improve the quality of corporate accounting information by strengthening the quality of internal control.Subsequently,robustness tests such as the measurement of substitution variables,adjustment of the sample industry scope and time span,change of regression methods,and endogenous processing such as fixed-effect models were performed,and the main conclusions remained unchanged.Third,in the sample group of non-state-owned enterprises and the sample group with a higher level of marketization,the supervision effect of pressure-resistant institutional investors is relatively significant,which has a strong effect on improving the quality of accounting information of listed companies.From a theoretical perspective,the research in this article has enriched the research literature on the factors affecting accounting information quality and corporate governance effects of institutional investors based on the principal-agent theory framework to a certain extent.From the perspective of practice,by examining internal control in institutions The intermediary effect that investors play in the process of corporate governance,and the impact of the nature of property rights and marketization on the relationship between institutional investors and the quality of accounting information can help regulators and the company to improve the company's internal and external supervision systems in a targeted manner.Optimizing the quality of the company's accounting information provides a certain direction.