Large Shareholders Equity Pledge,Quality Of Accounting Information Disclosure And Corporate Performance

Equity pledge as a new means of financing,since appeared in the Chinese capital market,will immediately become the major shareholders of listed companies favor "financing tool",however,since the second half of 2018,frequent pledge equity shares in the stock market fell to open line,nearly hundred actual control of listed companies were forced to change,what is more alarming is the equity pledge is blowing up may cause falling stock prices,even cause prices collapse.In such a crisis,major shareholders,as the main force of equity pledge,will inevitably adopt a series of operation and management means to maintain their control right.Small and medium-sized shareholders need high-quality accounting information disclosure to restrain their private interests.Facing the high proportion of equity pledge of major shareholders,investors also need high-quality accounting information disclosure to reduce the risk of their investment.In this case,what kind of economic consequences will be produced by the pledge of major shareholders' equity? What role does the quality of accounting information disclosure play?Based on principal-agent theory,signal transmission theory,information asymmetry theory and self-interest theory of control right,this paper studies the relationship among large shareholder equity pledge,the quality of accounting information disclosure and corporate performance.Using stata software for descriptive statistical analysis and correlation analysis,then multi-level regression is carried out to explore the impact of the two on the performance of the company from the perspective of equity pledge of major shareholders and the quality of accounting information disclosure respectively.The innovation of this paper is to bring the degree of pledge of major shareholders' equity,the quality of accounting information disclosure and corporate performance into the same system,At the same time,the paper studies the relationship between the pledge of major shareholders' equity and corporate performance and the difference in the quality of accounting information disclosure in enterprises with different property rights.The research results show that:(1)the higher the proportion of largeshareholders' equity pledge is under other conditions,which intensifies the agency conflict between large shareholders and small and medium shareholders,which is not conducive to the performance of the company.That is,the higher the proportion of large shareholders' equity pledge,the lower the performance level of the company.Compared with the state-owned enterprises,the higher the equity pledge rate of the major shareholders of non-state-owned enterprises,the more obvious the negative impact on the company's performance;(2)With the improvement of the quality of accounting information disclosure of listed companies,the more information asymmetry can be reduced,the more supervision and governance level of the board of directors can be increased,the more confidence investors have in investment can be increased,the less financing costs can be reduced,and the higher the level of corporate performance.Compared with state-owned enterprises,the higher the quality of accounting information disclosure of non-state-owned major shareholders,the more significant the positive impact on corporate performance;(3)Considering the adjusting effect of accounting information disclosure quality,this paper finds that the quality of accounting information disclosure has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between the equity pledge and the performance of the company.Finally,based on the above analysis,this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions in order to standardize the behavior of equity pledge of large shareholders,improve the corporate performance and the quality of accounting information disclosure.