Incentive Mode, Performance Behavior And Performance Effect

The concept of independent directors first originated in the United States.In the1930 s,the United States promulgated the "Investment Company Law" to mark the emergence of independent directors.During the development of the independent director system in China for more than a decade,relevant discussions have also emerged,especially for independent directors.There are more and more controversies on the performance of duties and the effectiveness of their duties.Whether the function of independent directors is like a vase,and whether the company's establishment of independent director seats can improve the governance effect and bring about performance growth.Many problems have always been academia and industry.The hotspots discussed.Essentially,the relationship between the independent director and the shareholder is also the principal-agent relationship between the principal and the agent,and a key entry point for dealing with the principal-agent problem is to take advantage of the two.The relationship is handled properly.If a reasonable incentive and compensation mechanism can be established to promote the interests of both the principal and the agent to be consistent,it can fundamentally effectively incentivize the independence of the independent director to treat the work,and the independent director can perform his duties more diligently and fully Give full play to its own governance role,thereby producing a benign chain reaction.Can independent directors effectively perform? It directly reflects the effect of the independent director system in corporate governance.This is an unavoidable problem.At present,the incentives of independent directors include two different measures: monetary compensation incentives and reputational incentives.The key factors for the effectiveness of independent directors in performing their duties.Therefore,studying the incentives,performance and performance of independent directors is of great theoretical and practical significance for corporate governance.This article uses 2013-2018 Shanghai and Shenzhen a-share listed companies as a research sample,uses SPSS23 software to perform regression analysis on the sample,and combines "proxy agency theory","incentive and constraint theory" and "reputation incentive hypothesis" to explore independent directors.The relationship between reputation incentives and monetary compensation incentives and the performance of duty performance,and the intermediary effect played by duty performance.The empirical results show that: when the size of the company is larger and there are no violations,the better the company's performance,Moreover,the intermediary effect of independent directors' performance of duty is significant;the compensation incentives of independent directors should be in a moderate range,less compensation will lead to insufficient incentives,the performance level of enterprises will be reduced,and the performance of duty will have a significant difference between the two.Intermediary role,and too much salary will lead to excessive incentives,poor corporate performance,and performance behavior does not have a significant intermediary role between the two.This article not only enriches the research on independent director incentives and corporate governance in theory,but also provides theoretical guidance for the actual election of independent directors by listed companies in practice,which is conducive to companies to use the governance role of independent directors to a greater extent to improve corporate performance.