Research On The Influence Of Board Characteristics On Enterprise R&D Investment

In recent years,with China’s social and economic development into a high-quality stage of development,how to scientifically and effectively transform economic development momentum,improve the quality of economic development,enhance economic efficiency has become a micro-enterprise level must pay attention to the matter,and the core issue is how to use technological innovation to enhance the efficiency of enterprise production and operation.And reduce operating costs to better enhance enterprise value and meet market demand.Especially with the deepening of China’s globalization process,the challenges and competitive pressures brought by the global wave of scientific and technological innovation force China’s enterprises to enter the fast lane of technological innovation,must get rid of the traditional imitation,follow and other models and actively turn to independent innovation model,in order to enhance China’s sustainable innovation capacity and level,and then To realize the high quality guarantee of China’s social and economic development.However,under the modern enterprise system,the separation of ownership and management rights makes the interests of managers and shareholders who assume the control rights of enterprises not entirely consistent.Especially in view of the characteristics of large investment,long cycle,high risk,uncertain returns and so on,managers often tend to be driven by personal interests.To reduce the long-term value of technological innovation investment for shareholders,thus restricting the cultivation of core competitiveness of enterprises.Based on the theory of corporate governance and technological innovation,this paper objectively summarizes the internal mechanism of the influence of Board Governance on technological innovation investment in modern enterprise system,and on this basis investigates the relevant logic of the influence of board structure,behavior and incentive characteristics on technological innovation investment in enterprises.Compile paths and put forward relevant research hypotheses.On this basis,this study uses the empirical data of A-share Manufacturing Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets to test the relevant hypotheses.The empirical results show that,on the one hand,the independence of the board of directors relative to the managers should be improved,including promoting the separation of the chairman and the general manager,increasing the proportion of independent directors outside,and strengthening the equity incentive of the board of directors,so as to help strengthen the supervisory ability of the managers to make investment decisions on technological innovation,and a higher proportion of independent directors.In addition to improving the ability of the board of directors to supervise the technological innovation decision-making of the managers,the directors can also provide expert opinions and suggestions for the technological innovation decision-making of the managers.Moreover,the construction of board equity incentive will help to close the long-term interests consistency between directors and enterprises,and thus help to enhance the attention of the board of directors to the technological innovation decision-making of enterprises,so as to ensure the scientific level of managers’ technological innovation decision-making.On the other hand,it is necessary to strengthen the construction of the operation mechanism of the board of directors and improve the operation efficiency in order to play a role in the process of enterprise strategic management.The research conclusion has important reference value for guiding the governance construction of Listed Companies in China and enhancing the investment of technological innovation.