Research On The Influence Of Institutional Investor's Shareholding On Non-efficiency Investment

As the basis for the listed companies to enhance their value and accumulate funds,investment activities are very important to the listed companies.However,the investment decisions of listed companies are not only affected by market factors,but also by shareholders and the influence of management and all kinds of investors.Once the investment decision of the listed company makes its investment scale deviate from the expected moderate investment scale,there will be inefficient investment,which will not only lead to the loss of the value of the company,but also affect the long-term development of the company.As an indispensable backbone of the capital market,institutional investors play an active role in supervising the investment decisions of invested companies.Therefore,this paper chooses the data of all listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets for three consecutive years from 2015 to 2017 as the research sample.This paper studies the influence of institutional investors' shareholding and institutional investor heterogeneity on the inefficient investment of listed companies by means of regression,and on the basis of the research,In this paper,the intermediary effect of institutional investors' shareholding and the influence of institutional investors' heterogeneity on inefficient investment is further studied by means of intermediary effect analysis.The results show that:(1)the overall shareholding of institutional investors has a significant and effective inhibitory effect on the overinvestment behavior of listed companies.The inhibition effect on underinvestment behavior of listed companies is not significant.(2)The pressure resistance institutional investor's stock holding has a significant and effective inhibitory effect on overinvestment behavior of listed companies.The inhibition effect on underinvestment behavior of listed companies is not significant.(3)The stress-sensitive institutional investors will not have a significant effect on the overinvestment and underinvestment behavior of listed companies.(4)In the listed companies with surplus free cash flow and excessive investment,both institutional investors' overall shareholding and pressure-resistant institutional investors' shareholding curb overinvestment by reducing free cash flow.