Research On Equity Incentive Performance And Its Influencing Factors Of China's Chi Next Listed Companies

Equity incentive plans for senior management personnel have been keen to be launch by China's Chi Next market listed companies in order to promote the growth of performance,they are not always effective because of many influential factors.Therefore,the research purpose of the paper is to explore the factors that affect the performance of the Chi Next listed companies after implement of equity incentive plans for executives,and the extent of these factors,and propose some countermeasures.The paper may help the theoretical exploration of the research on corporate governance issues and also provides some useful references for these companies when they think about how to optimize equity incentive plans or to improve internal governance mechanisms.The paper first uses the literature analysis method to sort out the research context of the factors affecting the performance of equity incentives and summarizes the factors that may affect the performance of equity incentives,including the three major contractual elements of equity incentives which are the key factors,equity characteristics,governance mechanisms and operating characteristics.Secondly,based on the understanding of principal-agent theory and incomplete contract theory,the paper analyzes the influence mechanisms of these factors on the performance of listed companies' equity incentives and analyzes these factors on the impact mechanism of equity incentive performance of Chi Next listed companies.In the empirical part,this paper adopts the principal component analysis method to integrate multiple performance indicators into a single performance evaluation index,uses the index as the explained variable and the above factors as the explanatory variable,and uses the static short panel data method to filter the regression model and estimate coefficients of the influencing factors.The empirical results show that: firstly,the implementation of the equity incentive plan caused the overall performance of Chi Next listed companies to decline slightly,but increasing the proportion of executive incentive stocks and the validity period can significantly improve performance;secondly the private nature made the company's overall performance decline,the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and the ratio of balanced concentrated ownership will hinder performance.The concentration of equity is positively correlated with incentive performance;thirdly,the implementation of duality of CEO and chairman of the board as well as the increase in the size of the board of directors and the proportion of independent directors will help improve performance;fourthly,the size of total asset has a positive effect on the performance of equity incentives,while the equity ratio has a negative effect.Finally,based on the research conclusions drawn,this paper proposes constructive countermeasures for the Chi Next listed companies: appropriately increase the ratio of incentives for senior executives and extend the term of equity incentives;improve the corporate governance system,implement the duality system,increase the size of the board of directors and the proportion of independent directors;encourage privately-owned enterprises to cooperate with government,step into the state-owned enterprise ecology and build industrial alliances;adjust the shareholding structure,appropriately reduce the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder,and increase the concentration of equity;increase the size of total assets and optimize the capital structure.