Study On The Delisting Of Zhonghong Stocks From The Perspective Of Actual Controller Tunneling Behavior

Since the establishment of China's capital market,the unreasonable shareholding structure has always been a problem.Even after the implementation of the split share structure reform,listed companies still generally have a high concentration of equity,and it is not uncommon for shareholders' meetings to become large shareholders.In this context,the principal-agent problem of listed companies has evolved from the contradiction between managers and major shareholders to the contradiction between major shareholders and the majority of small and medium shareholders.We call it the second type of agency problem.The major shareholders rely on their control of the listed company to make their own operating decisions in the course of the operating decision-making process of the listed company,and use the control to bring private benefits and infringe on small and medium investors.In response to this phenomenon,the relevant government functional departments have repeatedly issued relevant regulations and policies that have largely suppressed the occurrence of hollowing out,but it is difficult to eliminate them,and the hollowing out methods are becoming more hidden and complicated.The hollowing out of large shareholders not only adversely affects the operation and development of listed companies,but also infringes on the vital interests of small and medium shareholders.It is also very detrimental to the establishment of a stable capital market order in our country.The prevention and governance of related behaviors has become a top priority.We are concerned about the first time in 2018 that Zhonghong Stocks,which directly departed from the delisting mechanism because the closing price was lower than the par value for 20 consecutive trading days.Behind the continuous high delivery and huge liabilities is the hidden concealment led by the actual controller Wang Yonghong.Stock reduction behaviors,and these frequent and hidden hollowing-out behaviors have officially caused the reasons for Zhonghong's bad management and stock price crash.Therefore,this article through the study of the actual controller hollowing behavior in Dudi Zhonghong shares,has a wake-up effect for listed companies,the investment concept of small and medium investors and the capital market for the prevention and control of hollowing behavior.This article first elaborates the research background and significance of this paper,and then sorts out the development background of the case company.Based on the information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory,this paper studies the hollowing behavior dominated by the actual controller of Zhonghong.It is found that the following centralized tunneling methods exist in Zhonghong shares: 1.The actual controller's aggressive investment regardless of the company's operating conditions;2.The large shareholders who cooperate with unreasonable capital operations to raise the stock price to reduce their holdings;3.Whitewash the statements and conceal non-operating funds Occupation and disclosure of violations of illegal guarantees;4.A high percentage of equity pledge.It is these tunneling methods that have deteriorated the operating conditions of listed companies,and their stock prices have plummeted,leading to the outbreak of the final crisis and the delisting of listed companies.Through further analysis of the apparent reasons,it was found that the occurrence of the tunneling was due to the internal equity concentration of Zhonghong,and the power of the actual controller could not be balanced.In the case of insufficient external supervision,the characteristics of the irrational investment characteristics of small and medium shareholders were used.And it happened.Finally,based on the deficiencies summarized,suggestions are provided for the operation of listed companies,investment by small and medium investors,and external regulators.