Research On The Relationship Between Executive Incentive Mechanism And Innovation Investment

"Science and technology is the first productivity".In today's increasingly complex competitive environment,strengthening initiative in innovation and R &D is conducive to the expansion of enterprises and maintaining their leading position.Based on the theoretical analysis and empirical research,this thesis discusses the relationship between the main executive incentive mechanism and the innovation investment of enterprises from the perspective of principal-agent incentive mechanism,and introduces redundant resources from the perspective of resource-based theory,i.e.the absorbed redundant resources and the unabsorbed redundant resources as the adjustment variables,and at the same time investigates the acquisition of organizational resources and corporate governance The influence of ownership structure on the relationship between executive incentive mechanism and enterprise innovation,which has an important influence,is to introduce ownership concentration,institutional investor's shareholding ratio and circulating share ratio as adjusting variables,and to explore its role in executive compensation incentive,equity incentive,on-the-job consumption and promotion incentive and enterprise innovation investment.This thesis reviews and combs the relevant theories about executive incentive,enterprise innovation,redundant resources,equity structure and other aspects in the existing research results,as well as the research progress until recent years,analyzes and derives the research hypothesis and theoretical model of this thesis.Based on the panel data of 341 GEM listed companies from 2013 to 2017,this thesis examines the relationship between executive incentive,enterprise innovation,redundant resources,and ownership structure for enterprise innovation investment.Then,it analyzes the possible regulatory effects from two dimensions of redundant resources and ownership structure.The results of this study show that,as different measures of executive incentive mechanism,four main incentive mechanisms,namely salary incentive,equity incentive,on-the-job consumption and promotion incentive,can all significantly and positively promote the innovation investment of enterprises,which shows that it is necessary to establish a scientific and reasonable executive incentive mechanism to promote R &D innovation.The hypothesis of regulatory effect of redundant resources is partially supported,which shows that the effect of absorbed and unabsorbed redundant resources on the regulatory effect between executive incentive and enterprise innovation investment is not exactly the same.The regulatory effect of ownership concentration and institutional investors' shareholding ratio has also been partially verified.The research of this thesis enriches the research on the relationship between executive incentive and enterprise innovation investment,expands the research scope of redundant resources and ownership structure characteristics,and has certain theoretical significance.At the same time,it can also give enterprises some correct understanding,promote them to make good use of executive incentive mechanism,so as to enhance innovation investment.