Effect Evaluation And Risk Warning Of The Implementation Of ESOP In China

In June 2014,the SFC issued on the implementation of employee stock ownership plan guidance of listed companies.The employee stock ownership plan as an important system to explore the reintroduction of the securities market,hope to establish a benefit sharing mechanism,and make laborer and capital owner share the achievements of economic construction,so as to comprehensively deepen the reform of the economic field.However,in the past five years,China's ESOP is mostly in the "unrealized loss" and "reduction" of the dispute.On the one hand,China's ESOP is still in the groping stage due to its short implementation time and imperfect system design.And its specific mechanism,the way to influence enterprise value needs to be further explored.On the other hand,in view of the possible self-interested motives of major shareholders,the paper proves through empirical research that ESOP is a special tool for major shareholders to reduce their holdings,which is a unique problem in the development of China's capital market.Therefore,on the basis of relevant theoretical analysis and literature review,this paper took the listed companies that implemented the ESOP in A-share market from June 2014 to June 2019 as samples,analyzed the relationship between employee stock ownership and enterprise value through empirical research,and specifically analyzed its impact from three approaches: governance structure,operation capacity and leverage level.The implementation of employee stock ownership can have a positive impact on enterprise value.The empirical results show that the positive impact can be realized through two intermediary paths: governance structure and operational capacity,while the leverage level is not yet established.The overall impact of ESOP on enterprise value depends on the strength of corporate governance and operational capacity.In addition,as an incentive arrangement in the securities market,China's ESOP is likely to be one of the options for major shareholders to exit.The empirical results show that companies with the release of restricted shares are more likely to implement employee ownership in the next two to three years,which confirms that large shareholders use this as a tool to reduce holdings and cash out.At the same time,in view of the current serious floating loss of China's employee stock ownership plan or even facing the risk of "burst",this paper adopts Logistic regression to build a "burst" risk warning model.The purpose is to predict the future risk,and once risks are identified,early warning signals can be sent in time so that investors and business managers can react in time and turn "losses after the event" into "early warning".In addition,the current troubles of ESOP in China involve imperfect relevant laws and regulations,unclear employee stock ownership,and the resulting problems of corporate governance and insufficient realization of enterprise value.By referring to the relevant experience of developed countries and combining the reality of China,this paper discusses and tests the implementation effect of employee stock ownership in China,which is not only helpful to enrich the theory,but also helpful to standardize and improve the system in China.On the one hand,as ESOP can enhance the enterprise value,it can appropriately improve the incentive level of ESOP and give full play to the role of reducing agency costs and improving the operation level;On the other hand,the government should strengthen legislation,establish and improve the financial incentive and supervision mechanism.