Analysis On The Effectiveness Of Equity Incentives For Companies Listed On The New Third Board

As a long-term incentive means,equity incentive has always been the focus of corporate governance research.The separation of management and ownership in modern corporate structure has resulted in the main agent cost problem,which can be alleviated by equity incentive to some extent.The core of equity incentive is to maximize the interests of managers,maximize the interests of the same shareholders,effectively reduce agency costs,improve the performance of the company,and ultimately realize the value of the company.In recent years,with the emergence of the new third board,many unlisted enterprises have successfully listed on the new third board and become unlisted public companies.These companies also have some attributes of listed companies.In view of the differences between the listed companies and the new third board,whether the equity incentive policies applied by the listed companies are also applicable to the new third board companies,whether there are equity incentive methods for the new third board market and the effectiveness of implementing equity incentive in the new third board market need to be analyzed and studiedIn this paper,through the combination of theory and practice,literature,case study and comprehensive analysis,the new three board equity incentive research.Through the above research methods,we can draw the conclusions:1.The first year of ldxx's equity incentive has a positive and effective effect on the company,but the weak liquidity of equity in the new third board market and the low value of shares compared with the listed companies lead to the decrease of the marginal effect of this incentive,and the equity incentive plan will have an impact on the implementation effect of equity incentive;2 Equity incentive makes the management of the company It is more bound with the owner's interests,alleviates the principal-agent contradiction mentioned in the corporate governance to a large extent,makes the managers of the company think about the problems from the perspective of the owners of the company,and tends to invest in the long-term development in the formulation of the development strategy;on the other hand,it also supervises the behavior of the managers of the company to a certain extent and improves the management of the company.There is a significant positive correlation between executive power and executive effectiveness,which also confirms the incentive compatibility theory mentioned before;3.The setting of the lock up period can guarantee the effect of equity incentive for a long period of time,and to a certain extent,it can avoid the company's equity incentive objects to get rid of the interest binding between the company and themselves by quickly cashing out after acquiring the equity.,let the managers complete the behavior of "self motivation" through motivation.In the end of this paper,the following improvement measures are put forward:1.Taking limited partnership as the carrier platform of equity incentive of new third board enterprises;2 Paying attention to expanding the scope of incentive objects in equity incentive;3 Setting up a reasonable period of share prohibition and sufficient number of shares in equity incentive;4.Adding short-term benefit distribution mechanism in equity incentive of new third board enterprises;5.Increasing in equity incentive Add the corresponding innovation index as the exercise condition;6.Improve the performance appraisal system in the equity incentive of the new third board.