Research On The Impact Of Management Shareholding On Corporate Financialization

Since the 1980 s,economic globalization has flourished,and financialization has become a world trend from Western countries.Financialization is like a double-edged sword.On the one hand,free capital injection into the financial industry in the financial industry can promote the development of the industrial economy,and the financial industry can quickly provide funding to non-financial companies to make up for the funding gap;on the other hand,the high financial market Profitability also induces non-financial companies to invest a large amount of funds in financial markets,resulting in a shortage of funds for physical enterprises.In recent years,China's economic development has gradually slowed down,and the real economy's rate of return has declined significantly,while the financial industry still maintains a high rate of return and rate of return.Many non-financial companies have invested funds into the financial market and have become financialized.With the tendency of destabilization to emptiness.A large amount of investment in financial assets will crowd out investment in R & D and innovation activities of the enterprise,which will have an adverse impact on the long-term development of the enterprise.As an important decision maker of the enterprise,the management has an important role in the investment activities of the enterprise.The implementation of shareholding incentives for the management can effectively solve the principal-agent problem,alleviate the conflict of interest between the management and the company's shareholders,and reduce the management.Short-sighted behavior,focusing on the long-term development and value creation of enterprises.At present,most scholars' research on financialization is to study its consequences and causes.No scholar has studied the impact of corporate management on financialization.Therefore,based on the phenomenon of financialization of non-financial enterprises,this article starts from the perspective of management shareholding incentives.Taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies from 2000 to 2018 as the research object,the relationship between the management's shareholding ratio and the financialization of non-financial companies is studied.First,from a theoretical perspective,the relevant literature on corporate financialization,management shareholding incentives,corporate diversification and management shareholding is reviewed and combed to pave the way for subsequent empirical research,and to link management through risk avoidance and incentive effects The relationship between the layered shareholding and financialization,and the two effects have opposite effects.Two opposing hypotheses have been proposed.Through empirical results,we can know that(1)the proportion of management's shareholding is negatively related to corporate financialization,in order to avoid high risks The level of excessive financialization of enterprises brought about by financial assets,and managers with a high shareholding ratio will even try to avoid investment in financial assets from the perspective of shareholders.(2)This paper uses instrumental industry averages to test the endogenous effects of regulatory effects.The results show that the level of corporate diversification has a regulatory effect on the negative effects of the non-financial enterprise management shareholding ratio and the financialization level of the enterprise.(3)Diversified operating indicators have exacerbated the negative correlation between the shareholding of management in state-owned enterprises and the financialization of non-financial enterprises;(4)The relationship between the shareholding of management and the level of financialization of the enterprise caused by the difference in the company's location A certain impact,the effect of diversification on the relationship between management shareholding and corporate financialization has a certain moderating effect,and the adjustment effect in the western region is more obvious;(5)the Tobit model is used to test the robustness of the text.This paper supplements the literature on equity incentives or management influencing factor,and enriches the research on how management incentives affect corporate financialization.Based on China's current institutional background,this article studies the impact of management holdings on corporate financial asset allocation.It provides a good opportunity.Compared with developed countries,the development of China's economic system and environment is very uneven,and corporate governance mechanisms are not yet perfect,thus creating conditions for managers to influence corporate investment and financing decisions.