Global skepticism: Descartes, Wittgenstein, and the limits of inquiry

The global skeptic argues that we have no evidence for whether our perceptual experiences are of the world or are simply the production of an elaborate dream experience. The implied conclusion is that without such evidence none of our beliefs can be taken as knowledge---that is, if the argument is correct, we have no right to say our beliefs are of the external world. This claim, although canonized by Descartes, originates in the tumultuous era of the reformation and the la crise pyrrhonienne that followed. Once the traditional criteria for knowledge no longer commanded unreflective acceptance, skepticism of all kinds flooded European intellectual culture. Although the history of philosophy since Descartes has not looked favorably on his solution, his version of skepticism continues to befuddle contemporary philosophers. A popular attempt to resolve the difficulty is to bifurcate our beliefs into knowledge that is common and knowledge that is philosophical. This move, however, is necessary only if we accept Descartes' assumption that knowledge claims can be made outside the context in which they arise. When we consider knowledge contextually it reveals something fundamental about the skeptical hypothesis. Not all questions can be asked. Not, at least, in the way traditionally thought. It means that our knowledge has its limits, and thus, so too does philosophical inquiry.