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Unifying the concept of consciousness across the disciplines: A concept-based, cross-cultural approach

Posted on:2008-02-16Degree:Ph.DType:Thesis
University:Saybrook Graduate School and Research CenterCandidate:Jones, Peter NFull Text:PDF
GTID:2445390005950530Subject:Anthropology
Abstract/Summary:
The majority of studies concerning consciousness have examined and modeled the concept of consciousness in terms of particular lines of inquiry, a process that has circumscribed the general applicability of any results from such approaches. The purpose of this dissertation was to study consciousness from a concept-based, cross-cultural approach and to attempt to unify the concept across the cultures examined. The 4 cultures are the academic disciplines of philosophy, physics, psychology, and anthropology.; Consciousness was examined in terms of how the concept is framed and where the major limitations in each line of inquiry occur. The rationale for examining consciousness as a concept across 4 cultures was to determine whether there was any common component in each line's framing that could be used to unify the concept. The study found that experience itself was the primary unifying factor in each field's framing and that experience was treated as a nonreducible property within each line of inquiry. By taking experience itself (but not subjective experience) as a fundamental property, each culture's concept of consciousness becomes tractable. As such, this dissertation argues that experience should be taken as a fundamental property of the concept. The significance of this analysis is that by taking experience as a fundamental property, it becomes possible to unify the concept across the 4 cultures. This unification is presented as a unity thesis, which is a theory arguing for unification of the concept based on the fundamental of experience.; Following this theoretical examination, this paper discusses several key implications of the unity thesis, including implications of the unity thesis for the current status of altered states of consciousness and for the so-called hard and easy problems associated with the concept (at least within Occidental ontology). It is argued that the so-called hard problem does not exist when experience is taken as a fundamental property of ontological reality and that altered states of consciousness are in fact better understood as access states of consciousness based on unity thesis. The dissertation concludes with suggestions for further lines of research.
Keywords/Search Tags:Consciousness, Concept, Unity thesis, Across, Fundamental property, Experience
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