| A number of key conceptions of epistemic justification (that species of justification that attaches to beliefs and which is generally thought required in order to elevate true beliefs to the status of knowledge) are explicitly deontological in nature. That is, they hold that justification of this sort involves the satisfaction of certain intellectual duties, or the meeting of certain requirements, or the non-violation of restrictions, etc. Other views arguably presuppose a deontological conception, and are poorly motivated without one. Epistemic deontology, therefore, is of great moment to the study of human knowledge.;The observation, however, that belief-formation is importantly involuntary, threatens deontological approaches to the evaluation of those beliefs, for it is often argued that deontological evaluations require a greater degree of control over the relevant states of affairs than is plausibly had by human beings over their beliefs. One plausibly cannot have a duty to believe something when it is not up to one whether one believes it or not.;The argument for the involuntariness of belief is examined, refined, and defended. Several attempts to defend epistemic deontology are explored and critiqued. A new approach to that defense is presented in two forms. The first, more abstract, argues that the pressure to think deontological evaluations have no place where control is lacking derives from consideration only of cases where the thesis (that 'ought implies can') is plausible, and as such provides only very weak reasons to suppose the thesis to be more generally true. The second, more detailed, involves examination of those cases in which the thesis is plausible, providing deeper understanding of the thesis itself. It is argued that epistemic cases are importantly different from such cases for the thesis to apply to them in the same manner. The viability of deontological approaches to epistemic justification is thus preserved. |
