A defence of luck egalitarian principles

Luck egalitarianism is an approach to liberal egalitarian distributive justice, the goal of which is to provide a measure of how resources are to be divided in accordance with a guiding principle of equal concern and respect for citizens. Further, it aims to provide justification for inequalities that arise in such distributions. That is, those social goods over which we have control and therefore the power to distribute equally among members of society---motivated by the fundamental idea that all human beings are of absolute and equal moral worth---are those things we measure in order to determine whether given distributions are just or unjust. The view expands on a central idea, embedded in John Rawls's two principles of justice (specifically, his second---or "difference"---principle). This is the idea that circumstances beyond a person's control ought not to be reflected in her share of available social goods. The effects of bad brute luck on one's socio-economic circumstances should, to the greatest extent possible, be mitigated or neutralized. However, when inequalities arise as a result of people's voluntary choices, out of bad "option luck," compensation for these outcomes may be limited or unwarranted altogether. These inequalities may in fact be justified from the point of view of luck egalitarian distributive justice. This notion that people who suffer from bad option luck may not be entitled to egalitarian compensation for their poor socio-economic circumstances is one reason the view has come under attack from critics such as Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel Scheffler. Another important criticism, again attributable to the aforementioned authors, is that with its primary focus on distributive outcomes, and compensation in the form of material resources, the view is not adequately sensitive to issues of broader social inequality, and the relations between individuals that have little or nothing to do with their shares in society's supply of material goods.; In this thesis, I lay out what I take to be the important features of luck egalitarianism---as expressed by Ronald Dworkin and Gerald Cohen; survey some of the stronger objections to this view---as articulated by Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel Scheffler; and attempt to defend luck-neutralizing principles against these formidable objections. Further, I argue that there is an essential relationship between holding people responsible and treating them with respect. At the level of distributive principle, this is best expressed by allowing people to bear, to a significant extent, the distributive burdens---and benefits---of their voluntary choices. In addition, however, I maintain that holding people responsible is a necessary, but not sufficient part of treating them with respect. It is equally important that people not be allowed, as a matter of distributive principle, to fall below a minimum standard of socio-economic wellbeing. That is, it is not just, from the point of view of liberal egalitarianism, to express neglect for citizens. For this reason, luck egalitarian principles must be supplemented by some other principle or set of principles, which dictate that all citizens, in terms of their socio-economic condition, meet this minimum standard.