Protracted state insurgencies: Counterinsurgency lessons from Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colombia

This thesis applies counterinsurgency theory to four cases of protracted state insurgency to determine common failures in state counterinsurgency response. State measures in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colombia exhibit common trends that perpetuate internal conflict. The paper developed three sets of findings. The first set of findings support the hypothesis that states perpetuate conflict through ineffective counterinsurgency measures that fail to address the root causes of the insurgency. These findings are: counterinsurgency strategy inadequately integrates political and military measures; failure to give political objectives primacy over military action; and a lack of consistent counterinsurgency direction at the national level. The second set of findings support the hypothesis that states engage in de-legitimizing acts that alienate the target population. These findings are: repressive tactics, emergency regulations, and martial law are counterproductive; ineffective population security de-legitimizes the state government; and states inadequately control and employ paramilitaries and militias in an effective counterinsurgency role. Negotiations and reconciliation emerged as a major factor between the insurgent group and the state. This paper considered negotiations as part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy. The third set of findings support the hypothesis that negotiations rarely result in success and often lead to an escalation in hostilities. These findings illustrate that ceasefire violations and spoilers on both sides frustrate state attempts at negotiations.