| This dissertation is organized in three chapters. In the first chapter, which is a joint work with Rainer Haslemann and Kathartha Pistol', we explore how legal change affects lending behavior in twelve transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe In contrast to previous studies, we use hank level rather than aggregate data, which allows us to control for country level heterogeneity and analyze the effect of legal change on different types of lenders. Using differences-in-differences methodology to analyze the within country variation of changes in creditor rights protection, we find that lending volume increases subsequent to legal change. Further, we find that collateral law matters more for credit market development as compared to bankruptcy law. We also find that new entrants respond more strongly to legal change than do incumbents. In particular, foreign-owned banks extend their lending volume substantially more than do domestic banks, be they private or state owned. The same holds when we use foreign greenfield banks as proxies for new entrants. These results are robust after controlling for a wide variety of possibilities.; The second chapter of the thesis attempts to investigate whether creditor rights can be excessive. Much of our understanding of creditor's rights is based on the notion that creditors need to be well protected in order to facilitate the process of lending. As a result, in many countries, a major thrust is given to improvement in creditor rights. But what if those rights are too strong? Using firm-level data, I exploit variation in creditor rights generated by the passage of a secured transaction law in India to empirically document demand side (corporate) preferences. I find that improvement in the rights of secured creditors leads to a decease in equilibrium usage of secured debt by firms. I also document a reduction in total debt. These results suggest that there is a threshold level of creditor rights beyond which strengthening of creditor rights may lead to adverse effects and that borrowers contract away from these potential inefficiencies.; Finally, in the third chapter of my thesis, which is joint work with Ben Keys, Tamnoy Mukherjee and Amit Seru, we investigate whether securitization destroys the screening incentives of banks. Theories of financial intermediation suggest that securitization, the act of converting illiquid loans into liquid securities, could reduce the incentives of financial intermediaries to screen borrowers. We empirically examine this question using a unique dataset on securitized subprime mortgage loan contracts in the United States. We exploit a specific rule of thumb in the lending market to generate an instrument for ease of securitization and compare the composition and performance of lenders' portfolios around the ad-hoc threshold. Conditional on being securitized, the portfolio that is more likely to be securitized defaults by around 20% more than a similar risk profile group with a lower probability of securitization. Crucially, these two portfolios have similar observable risk characteristics and loan terms. We use variation across lenders (banks vs. independents), state foreclosure laws, and the timing of passage of anti-predatory laws to rule out alternative explanations. Our results suggest that securitization does adversely affect the screening incentives of lenders. |
