Essays in regulatory focus and price acceptance

Part one of the thesis studies differential diagnosticity towards substantive extrinsic information available in the environment. This research tests the interaction between regulatory focus and availability of extrinsic-substantive information such as consensus information, on the range of acceptable price. Prior research on regulatory focus led us to two divergent predictions. Our findings lend support to the asymmetric-elaboration account. Under this account, only prevention-oriented consumers are likely to change their acceptable price range if combinations of favorable-and-unfavorable consensus information are available in the environment, while promotion-oriented consumers disregard such information. We find that this difference is due to the differences in the level of difficulty experienced in specifying acceptable price range across the two regulatory foci. Further, we also undertake random-parameters regression models that provide unique general findings. For example, we find that for promotion-oriented consumers it is their high-level product construal, while for prevention-oriented consumers it is their low-level product construal that influences their respective acceptable price ranges, irrespective of level of external information available. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.Part two of the dissertation discusses how consumer choices differ over a series of gains or losses. We propose that regulatory focus differences should lead consumers, with distinct regulatory foci, to display different likelihoods of integrating (segregating) a series of losses (gains). Based on this general proposition, we delve into studying the interaction between option framing and regulatory focus on consumers' options choices. In the additive (subtractive) option frame, consumers are presented with a base (fully-loaded) model and are asked to add (delete) options that they want (don't want). In line with our theorization, we find that this interaction significantly impacts the number of options chosen, reference price, amount of time taken to make decision and the value perceived in the options chosen. However, we also find that option framing may not work with promotion-oriented consumers. Further, we show that value perceived in the options chosen mediates the relationship between regulatory focus and purchase commitment. Finally, we test the influence of amount of time taken to make the options choice, and other predictors, on the number of options chosen, using two-step maximum likelihood estimation. The theoretical and managerial implications are discussed and an agenda for future research is laid out.Part three of the thesis looks into how consumers' prior price acceptance commitments lead to differences in information processing. We argue that if consumers commit themselves to a predetermined level of evaluation for the stimulus, then they will process information pertaining to the stimulus using only specific processing strategies. Essentially, we argue that committing to a goal is decisive in determining goal means. We specifically propose that when consumers commit themselves to a predetermined evaluation that is above (below) the market value of the stimulus, then they will consciously and/or automatically undertake processing strategies that instigate a regulatory fit (a regulatory misfit), irrespective of whether they are promotion or prevention oriented. Further, the regulatory fit or misfit instigated is purported to linger and is transferred to other objects within a reasonable timeframe. The managerial implications of these findings are discussed.