A comparison of pay-as-bid and marginal pricing in electricity markets

This thesis investigates the behaviour of electricity markets under marginal and pay-as-bid pricing. Marginal pricing is believed to yield the maximum social welfare and is currently implemented by most electricity markets. However, in view of recent electricity market failures, pay-as-bid has been extensively discussed as a possible alternative to marginal pricing.;In this research, marginal and pay-as-bid pricing have been analyzed in electricity markets with both perfect and imperfect competition. The perfect competition case is studied under both exact and uncertain system marginal cost prediction. The comparison of the two pricing methods is conducted through two steps: (i) identify the best offer strategy of the generating companies (gencos); (ii) analyze the market performance under these optimum genco strategies.;The analysis results together with numerical simulations show that pay-as-bid and marginal pricing are equivalent in a perfect market with exact system marginal cost prediction. In perfect markets with uncertain demand prediction, the two pricing methods are also equivalent but in an expected value sense. If we compare from the perspective of second order statistics, all market performance measures exhibit much lower values under pay-as-bid than under marginal pricing. The risk of deviating from the mean is therefore much higher under marginal pricing than under pay-as-bid.;In an imperfect competition market with exact demand prediction, the research shows that pay-as-bid pricing yields lower consumer payments and lower genco profits.;This research provides quantitative evidence that challenges some common claims about pay-as-bid pricing. One is that under pay-as-bid, participants would soon learn how to offer so as to obtain the same or higher profits than what they would have obtained under marginal pricing. This research however shows that, under pay-as-bid, participants can at best earn the same profit or expected profit as under marginal pricing. A second common claim refuted by this research is that pay-as-bid does not provide correct price signals if there is a scarcity of generation resources. We show that pay-as-bid does provide a price signal with such characteristics and furthermore argue that the price signal under marginal pricing with gaming may not necessarily be correct since it would then not reflect a lack of generation capacity but a desire to increase profit.