| If I know that I will be tortured tomorrow, it is rational for me to fear this torture. One explanation for the rationality of my attitude is that I am the individual that is to be tortured. Derek Parfit argues that this is incorrect. According to Parfit, the rationality of my fear is instead explained by the fact that I bear a particular psychological relation, the psychological continuity relation, to the individual that will be tortured. Parfit distinguishes the psychological continuity relation from the identity relation, and thus concludes that identity is not what matters. Let us call this thesis, the thesis that my concern for the individual tortured is not explained by the fact I am the person tortured, Parfit's Thesis.;Parfit's Thesis is counter-intuitive. Nonetheless, some have attempted to utilize it to further various debates concerning personal identity. I argue that this is a suspect strategy. Parfit's Thesis may be true; however, many of the uses to which it has been put in contemporary debates have been illegitimate. Those who have employed the thesis have failed to recognize the various presuppositions of Parfit's arguments for the thesis.;The use of Parfit's Thesis by adherents of Animalism is discussed. Animalism states that you and I are identical to human animals. Thus, you and I have the persistence conditions of such animals. I note that the Animalist cannot, without argument, adopt Parfit's such relation, then persons do not exist. Given these two premises, and Parfit's Thesis, it follows that persons do not exist. I diagnose numerous flaws in Stone's argument. The final chapter examines the relationship between Parfit's thesis and recent arguments offered by John McDowell and Tyler Burge charging that Parfit's own account of personal identity is circular. |
