Words as tools: An investigation into the normativity of meaning

My thesis offers a novel approach to the problems that Ludwig Wittgenstein's Rule Following Argument presents us with, and which are formulated by Saul Kripke as skepticism about meaning. Although I draw upon Wittgenstein's work, and try to explain it, my work is not exegetical in its nature, but an attempt to offer a comprehensive solution to an important philosophical question concerning meaning.;My main premises are that the following of a linguistic rule is a normative activity (i.e., there is a sense in talking about correct and incorrect ways to follow the rule), and that in order to talk of correct and incorrect applications of a rule we must be able to point to objective criteria that justify such claims. As Kripke's work shows, such criteria are unavailable at the time when the agent is following the rule, or using the word. Thus---unlike Kripke's own solution to the problem---my suggestion is that we have to look for these criteria only after the rule has been followed. The core of my thesis is that knowing the meaning of a word involves knowing how to use it. I argue that a successful solution to the problems raised by RFA will employ Wittgenstein's analogy between words and tools. The use of words is similar to that of tools, hence like the use of a tool, the use of a word should be evaluated according to the results that it yields in the world (which naturally appear only after it has been used).;My first chapter presents the problem as it emerges in Wittgenstein's and Kripke's work. Chapter two examines and rejects various solutions to it, as currently offered in the literature. In chapter three I offer my own solution to the problem, using as an example a Robinson Crusoe who marks his way on his island with signs. The criteria for the correct use of these signs are Robinson's success in navigating the island. Chapter four addresses anticipated objections to my account. In chapter five I extend the picture and show how the lesson from the above example applies to meaning in general, and how my account fits with the major themes of the Philosophical Investigations .