| The aim of this thesis is to consider what reasonably follows from the hypothesis that the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be interpreted from a mystical point of view. That is, if the final passages on the mystical are considered as the conclusion of the book, how does this end follow from Ludwig Wittgenstein's claim that the Tractatus deals with the problems of philosophy?;Next, the thesis will examine the question of showing in three parts. First, it will demonstrate that Wittgenstein's notion of showing forms the basis for his separation from Russell's theory of types; second, it will illustrate that there is no distinction between what is shown and what shows itself, and third, it will connect Wittgenstein's notion of showing to the mystical.;Following this, the thesis is concerned with what sense we can grasp of what cannot be put into words. In dealing with the eternal and the mystical, this section will offer a view from outside language to satisfy both concerns (i.e. both reality and what cannot be expressed in words). Viewing the world in this way is the mystical.;Finally, we will discuss sense and nonsense, and the mystical from the view of other philosophers in order to show that Wittgenstein's thoughts on nonsense and the mystical cannot be interpreted from either a metaphysical point of view or an anti-metaphysical perspective.;First, I will attempt to show that Russell's method based on analysis is an inadequate means of understanding what cannot be put into words. Second, in contrast to analysis, I will consider the method Wittgenstein uses in light of the topics in the Tractatus that cannot be expressed in words. This second point is the focus of this project because, as I will show, while reality cannot be expressed in words, neither can it be considered nonsense. |
