Language and the objectivity of value (Donald Davidson)

In this dissertation, I use the Davidsonian apparatus of radical interpretation to argue that thoughtful creatures share a number of important traits, among them: general beliefs about the world, a largely correct set of beliefs, general preferences, and ethical evaluative responses. In order to do this, I elucidate the theory of radical interpretation as developed by Donald Davidson, mainly concentrating on the propositional attitude of belief. I set out six theses which are endorsed and argued for by Davidson in a variety of places, consolidating and in some places replacing Davidson's arguments. In the second chapter, I focus on the process of triangulation. I argue that an emphasis on the role of triangulation in radical interpretation improves our understanding of the basis of objectivity by helping us to better understand the relationship among interpreters and their environment. I return to the six theses, exploring arguments which focus on the first- and second-person perspectives of agents engaged in communication rather than on the third-person perspective of an interpreter examining a speaking subject. At the end of the second chapter, I explain how radical interpretation provides a plausible account of objectivity.; In the third chapter, I begin to examine evaluative propositional attitudes. I argue for the shared-value thesis, the claim that all thinking creatures share certain basic values. I examine the role of evaluative attitudes in radical interpretation, explaining the basis of objectivity in evaluative discourse. In the fourth chapter, I argue that the scope of the shared-value thesis includes ethical values. In order to do so, I adapt Tyler Burge's argument that rational creatures have a concept of agency which allows them to exercise responsibility over some of their propositional attitudes. I also address the issue of determining the truth-conditions on ethical evaluations. In the final chapter, I briefly address some rival accounts of ethical evaluation. I argue that the account derived from Davidsonian radical interpretation is superior to accounts offered by Allan Gibbard, Simon Blackburn, Crispin Wright, Bernard Williams, and David Brink.