| The fundamental question of private law's remedies is how do subsequent remedial actions rationally address prior failures. This question can be approached either intrinsically or extrinsically. While the former justifies and explains the remedial action from within the original plaintiff-defendant relationship, the latter welcomes external principles and goals. The arguments of this thesis fit within an intrinsic approach to private law's remedies. To this end, several arguments are levied against the extrinsic perspective, and, in particular, its confidence in the separation of rights and remedies. For positive inspiration, it looks to two leading intrinsic theoretical accounts---those of Ernest Weinrib and John Gardner, respectively---with an eye to revealing what, if any, meaningful differences there are between the two.;Using the language and logic of practical reasons and reasoning, this dissertation suggests that remedies can be understood in one of two ways. First, the remedy is just the same as the original reason. If I fail to pay my debt on the date it is due, my subsequent remedial action in paying it later is carried out because of the original reason, namely, that I owe a debt to someone. Second, the remedy is a reflection of certain second-order reasons that are part of the original (operative) reason. These are reasons not to act for certain other reasons that counsel against the performance of the first-order reason to do the obligatory action. These reasons stick around and tell you to do something; that doing nothing is not optional. If I break your toe, I can no longer satisfy the original reason not to break your toe; however, I can and must do something to address my initial failure. The content of this reparative action is constrained by the original reason not to break your toe. While its first-order strength is no longer available---one can no longer act for the reason it recommends---it can nonetheless provide guidance with respect to what the next-best thing might be. |
