| The first chapter of this thesis develops a theory of optimal provision of commitment devices to people who value both commitment and flexibility, and whose preferences differ in the degree of time inconsistency. If time inconsistency is observable, then both a planner and a monopolist provide devices that help each person commit to the efficient level of flexibility. But the combination of unobservable time inconsistency and preference for flexibility creates an adverse-selection problem. To solve it, the monopolist and (possibly) the planner inefficiently curtail flexibility in the device for a more inconsistent person, and may have to add unused options to, or even distort, the device for a less inconsistent person. Flexibility is curtailed in a peculiar way that is evocative of existing commitment devices. This theory has normative as well as positive implications for private and public provision of these devices.;The second chapter of this thesis considers games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. The chapter focuses on the problem of characterizing the equilibrium outcomes of such games. It first shows that, to solve this problem, one can invoke neither Myerson's Inscrutability Principle, which holds in agency games with one informed principal, nor the Extended Taxation Principle, which holds in common-agency games with uninformed principals. It then provides two characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes: one for games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and one for games in which they participate with the agent in making such decisions. |
