| In this thesis I examine the relation between CEO turnover and subsequent internal control material weaknesses. Drawing on the literature that agency problems around CEO turnover are likely to increase and that CEO turnover causes organizational dislocation, I posit that CEO turnover may be associated with weak internal control quality. Using 7, 680 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2010 in the U.S. market, I document that firms with CEO turnover within three years before the internal control weakness disclosure tend to be associated with more internal control material weaknesses than firms without CEO turnover.;This thesis also documents the impact of Chairman and CEO duality on the relation between CEO turnover and internal control material weaknesses. CEO and Chairman non-duality implies less interests alliance between the CEO and the shareholders and thus may lead to more agency problems around CEO turnover as well as more post-turnover organizational dislocation. The findings show that in firms whose CEO is not Chairman of the board the CEO turnover is significantly related with subsequent internal control material weaknesses while in firms whose CEO is also the Chairman the relation between CEO turnover and internal control material weakness is no longer significant.;Keywords: CEO Turnover, Internal Control Material Weakness, CEO and Chairman Duality. . |
