Mysticism and social ethics: Feminsit reflections on their relationship in the works of Evelyn Underhill, Simone Weil and Meister Eckhart

A number of western scholars have found the relationship between mystical experience and social ethics problematic. They have claimed that mystical experience is at least amoral if not immoral, self serving and/or world denying. This thesis examines such charges as they appear in western scholarship on mysticism, paying particular attention to the philosophical presuppositions and constructs that underlie scholarly interpretation and evaluation of mystical experience. The thesis relies on a definition and understanding of mysticism derived from the writings of mystics. In so doing, it makes no attempt to establish the validity in the sense of 'truth or falsity' of the mystics' claims about such experience.;The thesis begins by examining the responses to some of the above named charges in the work of two western scholars--James Horne and Steven Katz. After acknowledging the considerable contribution of these two authors to the discussion of mysticism and social ethics, the thesis moves on to identify certain critical issues not touched upon in their work. Of crucial importance here is a failure in their study of mysticism to examine some important gender considerations including the infrequency of the accounts of ordinary women's mystical experience and the insights of feminist scholarship on mysticism.;Using the work of twentieth century feminist scholars, the thesis identifies four central philosophical issues crucial to the discussion of mysticism and social ethics. These include the nature of reality, the human self, the body and the role of personal experience as bearer of religious authority and knowledge. After identifying and discussing these issues as they arise in feminist scholarship, including feminist scholarship on mysticism, the thesis goes on to offer a reappraisal of three prominent western mystics--Evelyn Underhill, Meister Eckhart and Simone Weil.;The thesis concludes by arguing that if certain conditions exist, mystical experience can be seen as foundational for a mystic's morality in the sense of being formative of the mystic's decision making process.