The criticism of metaphysics in Hegel and Nietzsche

In this dissertation I have a two fold thesis: (1) Hegel and Nietzsche are allies in the struggle against metaphysical, moral and epistemological dualism. Both are critical of the abstract, conceptual oppositions (Gegensatze) which they agree in seeing as the essence of metaphysics, and they seek to find a mode of philosophizing that does not succumb to them and their all but inevitable correlates, the dualism of appearsnce and reality. (2) While Hegel presents a profound and cogent alternative to metaphysical thinking, Nietzsche rejects the traditional dualisms to replace them by his own unmediated opposition, which is as metaphysical as the others.;The first chapter surveys the literature on Hegel and Nietzsche. The second and third chapters demonstrate that Hegel and Nietzsche are both critics of a mode of thought which they characterize as metaphysical. I argue that Hegel's conception of metaphysics differs from Nietzsche's in certain ways, but that his criticisms nevertheless apply to the metaphysics which Nietzsche describes. My conclusion is that Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics is based upon the opposition of life and metaphysical understanding (Verstand), but that within Nietzsche's own terms this opposition is itself a metaphysical one. Nietzsche's critique is therefore vitiated by his failure to challenge the antithesis of these terms. Hegel's critique, on the other hand, is an immanent critique of Verstand and resolves all categorial Gegensatze, including that between thought and life. Hegel's method is therefore truly "non-metaphysical" and avoids the self-contradiction which besets Nietzsche's philosophy.;In the final chapter I compare the dialectical conception of the subject put forward by Hegel with the heroic, "Dionysian" conception of the subject promoted by Nietzsche, and then I seek to bring the fundamental difference between Hegel and Nietzsche into sharper focus by looking at the way the two philosophers deal with the theme of tragedy. I show that Nietzsche's failure properly to appreciate the dialectic of tragic hubris causes him to overlook the process whereby individuality is transformed into a moment of truly sittlich, communal identity. My conclusion is that Nietzsche's devaluation of the sense of selfhood which resides in association, institutionalized social life and religious community is rooted in this oversight.