The transatlantic discursive regime and French policy in information and computer technology: 1945-1981

This thesis explains the French inability to develop an autonomous information and computer technology (ICT) industry as a result of the participation of the French industry and policy makers in a transatlantic discursive regime. I define the concept of discursive regime to mean not only a set of transatlantic international norms and procedures or the congruence of views between sectors of the member governments of the regime. This concept also includes disputes and divergences of interest and emphasizes the role of the agents in the formation and transformation of regimes. The emphasis on agents however did not entail a rejection of the concept of structure but implies a simultaneous occurrence of structure and agency in the formation of historical events within a universe of political discourse. Thus, I use the concept of universe of political discourse to show competing discourses in the analysis of internal ICT policy-making both in the US and France and the concept of discursive regime as an alternative methodological framework to neo-realism, liberal regime theory and the neo-Gramscian approach to international relations.;Using these concepts, I argue that from 1946 onwards, with respect to ICT, the US Air Force leadership within the US military establishment was the critical force that linked the military sphere to science, technology and industry within the US universe of political discourse in ICT. The mode of this linkage was provided by the US Air Force's perceptions and priorities of air power and air defense that created a technological dynamism in information and computer technology. Moreover, I show that US Air Force structured the transatlantic space militarily, scientifically and technologically through NATO and the OECD. In keeping with this argument I demonstrate how in the period 1945-1965, NATO priorities in defense and the OECD science and user orientation in computer policy were internalized by French decision-makers. I show that during this period, France's universe of political discourse in ICT adopted an Atlantic orientation by choosing American computers in order to respond to the NATO concern with inter-operability. As the French military and telecommunications authorities had chosen IBM computers, this choice motivated French electronics companies to seek alliances with American interests, in order to survive within the French defense procurement market.;In 1968, when the French Delegation a la recherche scientifique et technique (DGRST) formulated a plan to oppose NATO and OECD policies and to create a European industrial specificity in electronics, computer and telecommunications, this plan failed. This failure was due to the fact that while the plan of the DGRST depended on the EEC member countries' political willingness to challenge American views within NATO and the OECD, EEC member countries and their firms felt that their interests were better served within NATO and the OECD, rather within a DGRST-led fortress Europe. The European resistance to the DGRST plan strengthened the relationships between the French and US ICT industries in the period 1974-1981.