Font Size: a A A

Elections, electoral pressure, and macroeconomic policy: The political economy of elections in Korea and Taiwan

Posted on:2003-11-28Degree:Ph.DType:Thesis
University:University of California, Los AngelesCandidate:An, Yong HeunFull Text:PDF
GTID:2466390011484295Subject:Political science
Abstract/Summary:
This dissertation study aims at exploring the relationship between elections and macroeconomic policies in Korea and Taiwan. This research performs two tasks. It refines the political business cycle (PBC) model and challenges the bureaucratic dominance theory.; To refine the PBC model, I review previous empirical and theoretical debates on the relevancy of the PBC model and relax the ‘hidden assumption’ regarding electoral pressures on an incumbent government's incentive to manipulate economic policies before elections, so as to get votes. From these debates, I derive my first hypothesis: given such factors as the fixed timing of elections, incumbent governments' control of fiscal and monetary institutions, and manageable economic conditions, incumbent governments will attempt to pursue macroeconomic manipulation before elections. I then relax the hidden assumption regarding the extent of electoral pressure on incumbent governments' incentives to manipulate macroeconomic policies. This process leads me to deduce four hypotheses, centering on such variables as government popularity, electoral rules, regime type, and the closeness to election dates. The expectation is that the degree of popularity, the degree of electoral distortion by electoral rules, regime type, and the closeness to election dates, all affect the extent to which incumbent governments manipulate fiscal and monetary policies.; By detecting electoral cycles in Korean and Taiwanese fiscal and monetary policy, I offer a challenge to the conventional wisdom, the bureaucratic dominance theory that disregards the roles of political actors and elections.; The time-series regression analyses of this dissertation reveal that, in the area of monetary policy, Korean and Taiwanese governments do not perform policy manipulation in every election. Rather, ruling governments tend to manipulate policies only when faced with difficult economic and political conditions. In the area of fiscal policy, Korean governments have carried out different degrees of policy manipulation, depending on their popularity. In addition, democratic Korean governments have been under incremental electoral pressure. Taiwanese governments have manipulated their fiscal policies prior to every election. They have also been most likely to manipulate fiscal policies when faced with bad economic and political situations.
Keywords/Search Tags:Economic, Election, Political, Policies, Electoral, Policy, Fiscal, Manipulate
Related items