The GATT TRIPS agreement: Neo-classicism or neo-colonialism? An appraisal of the political economy of the international patent system before and after the TRIPS agreement

The experience of developed countries is said to support the view that markets and legal institutions encouraging the creation and trading in new technology are pre-conditions for material progress and development. The patent system is presumed a key legal institution for the creation of and trade in technology. The recently signed GATT TRIPS agreement sharply reiterates the supposed superiority of this model to some reluctant developing countries.;The thesis considers the GATT TRIPS agreement and the preference of advanced countries for moving negotiation of the international patent regime to the GATT, a forum in which they can bring to bear their enormous trading leverage. The implications of GATT intellectual property multilateralism for trading patterns is considered.;The thesis suggests that the rigorously analytical apparatus of neoclassical trade and economic theory does not take account of the brutal realities of life in developing countries. The need for long term economic stability in developing countries facing an increasingly competitive world trading environment may require recognising other strategic forms of patent protection in these countries. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).;The thesis considers the impact of economic theory on legal policy for patents. This leads to a discussion of the special circumstances of developing states which may render general patent theory inapplicable in these countries. These circumstances include structural differences such as capital scarcity and a differing market for suitable technology. The patent system's contributions to technology dispersal is restricted by the limited effectiveness of patent disclosures. As well, factors lying outside the patent system appear to decisively influence industry decisions on the transfer of technology to developing countries. Consideration of the social and economic costs of the patent system casts doubt on whether developing countries necessarily benefit from enhanced patent protection.