Three studies on strategic behaviour: Allocation mechanism, vertical contract and debt buyback

This thesis comprises three chapters, each dealing with a topic related to strategic behaviours. Chapter 1 studies a topic of the theory of implementation. A planner wants to give an indivisible good to one of several individuals who values it most, without any monetary transfer. However, the planner does not know who is most deserving. The contribution of this chapter is that it presents several efficient mechanisms which the planner can use to achieve his objective in the situations where each individual's valuation of the good may or may not be common knowledge among the individuals.;The objective of Chapter 2 is to study the welfare implications of the policy prohibiting price floors in contracts between film distributors and exhibitors. A two-stage model is constructed to capture the basic features of the industry contracts: an exhibitor pays its distributor a guarantee as well as a percentage of the admission revenue; however, it retains all the revenue from selling snack food in theatres. It is shown that when movie-goers' reservation prices for movies and for snack foods are not negatively correlated, prohibiting price floor on admissions is welfare-improving. Furthermore, if a price floor is permitted, an attempt to bar integration between a distributor and an exhibitor will not be welfare-improving. These policy implications, however, crucially depend on the assumption of nonnegative correlation between movie-goers' reservation prices for movies and for snack foods.;In Chapter 3 the buyback option for settling LDC debts is evaluated through a theoretical model. Contrary to the majority of studies on the option, this analysis demonstrates that buybacks are welfare-improving to both a LDC and its creditors even at the ex post secondary market prices. It also shows that the so-called free-rider problem can't explain why creditors are unwilling to accept market-based discount buybacks. I propose and prove an alternative explanation that the unwillingness of creditors is caused by their market power. The predictions from this model are shown to be consistent with many historical facts and the current debt crises. An empirical study is also conducted to test the basic premise of the model.