Ownership, control, and performance of international joint ventures: The case of the People's Republic of China

International equity joint ventures have recently triggered renewed attention into their determinants and patterns. Theoretical progress has been made by applying transaction cost theory and bargaining power theory to explain multinational firms' choice between whole and joint ownership in foreign subsidiaries. In this thesis we propose an integrated conceptual framework of international equity joint ventures drawing upon a synthesis and extension of transaction costs theory and bargaining power theory. Following this conceptual framework, we have conducted a two-part, comprehensive study of international equity joint ventures in China with respect to their formation, management control, and performance. Case studies, binomial logistic regression and Tobit models, drawing on a large sample of 1,687 international equity joint ventures in China, find that the key determinants that have been found in the studies of joint ventures in the western countries continue to affect ownership pattern and management control of international equity joint ventures in China. On the other hand, some new factors that are unique to international equity joint ventures in China have been identified, and these factors contribute to the explanation of the joint ventures' formation, ownership pattern, management control and performance.