The objective and subjective deductions in Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'

In The Bounds of Sense P. F. Strawson seeks to reconstruct Kant's argument in the transcendental deduction (TD) of the categories independently of Kant's theory of synthesis. Strawson's task may be seen as an attempt to break apart what Kant once in the Preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason referred to as two "sides" of his inquiry in the Deduction chapter, the objective and subjective deductions (OD and SD).;This essay proposes a new approach to the SD and its relation to the OD. It is argued that the SD is as philosophical an inquiry as the OD, that it in fact contains a TD of the concept of I (a Kantian "fixed and abiding" self) where the theory of synthesis does play an important role, but only as the outcome of Kant's analysis of temporal consciousness. It is also argued that the first premise of the OD (as a TD of the categories) is in fact the final conclusion of the SD (as a TD of the concept of I), and that the OD must therefore rely on the SD for the justification of that premise.;A detailed analysis of Wolff's and Strawson's interpretation of Kant is provided in Chapter 1 of this essay. Chapter 2 suggests an account of Kant's method for producing any TD of a priori concepts or, more precisely, for proving a priori the reference of such concepts to their presumed objects. By means of this method, the OD (as a TD of the categories) is reconstructed in Chapter 3, and the SD (as a TD of the concept of I) in Chapter 4.;R. P. Wolff expounds a different view about the relation of the OD to the SD in Kant's Theory of Mental Activity. Although, like Strawson, Wolff also interprets the OD as a philosophical inquiry where the TD of the categories is to be found, and the SD as a psychological inquiry which results in Kant's theory of synthesis, he thinks there is an "indissoluble tie" between the two deductions.