THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT'S LINGUISTIC DOCTRINES

The principal aim of this study is to show that several claims about language which Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) advanced are based on philosophical assumptions, arguments and hypotheses and not on empirical work on natural languages or on his prejudice in favor of classical languages and cultures. After the introduction, in which I discuss Humboldt's philosophical studies and historical influences upon him, the dissertation proceeds in two main parts. In part II, 'The philosophical foundations', I expose Humboldt's basic philosophical assumptions and arguments about language and thought. In part III, 'The linguistic doctrines', I take up three linguistic claims and show that they must be regarded as conclusions based upon the philosophical foundations discussed in part II.;The main results of the dissertation are given in part III, 'The linguistic doctrines', where I take up three claims in which the preceding philosophical foundations are found to be operative. First, in III A I argue that the inflectional superiority thesis (the claim that languages with inflectional syntax are superior to other kinds of languages) is advanced by Humboldt because of the articulation doctrine and the dual-designation doctrine discussed in II A and B. Second, in III B I argue that the linguistic relativity thesis (the claim that thinking is determined by language) must be divided into (a) a central claim about language and thinking in general, which derives from the articulation doctrine, and (b) the conjuction of this central claim with the phenomena of language variation and the associated themes of national character and perceptual variation. Third, in III C I argue that Humboldt's advocacy of a 'dispositional' rather than 'mimetic' account of poetics requires precisely the kind of theoretical grounding which his linguistic writings provide.;In the conclusion, part IV, I compare Humboldt's doctrine that a language is a 'world-view' with Heidegger's use of etymology, and make some philosophical criticisms of Humboldt's views.;Part II includes six chapters. In chapter II A I show that Humboldt's claim that language is a necessary condition for thinking rests upon an assumption that there are two distinct modes of thinking, and that language is necessary for the transition from the first to the second mode. I call this the 'articulation doctrine'. In chapter II B I show that Humboldt makes a distinction between 'object' and 'relational' designation, which translates into a distinction between 'lexical' and 'grammatical' designation. In chapters II C-F I take up several aspects of Humboldt's treatment of language variation. In these chapters I discuss his advocacy of universal grammar (II C), and his attempts to give an explanation of how linguistic variation arose, based on 'perceptual' variation of physical environment (II D) and primordial variation of national character (II E). In II F I bring together several themes from the chapters on variation by constructing a simple model language, partly following examples given by Humboldt.