| This study assesses the U.S. bargaining chip approach in strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The study's theoretical framework is based upon several concepts inherent in the theory of compellence as conceptualized by Schelling (1966) and Craig and George (1983). Furthermore, several key elements of domestic politics are incorporated into the framework to add richness to this traditional conception of inter-state bargaining. The empirical validity of the hypotheses rests on the findings generated by four case studies, including the use of the Strategic Defense Initiative as a bargaining chip. This study's findings show that there is, in fact, no basis for traditional criticisms levelled at the use of bargaining chips in arms control. However, the study strongly suggests that policy-makers should be prepared to escalate the operation of a negative leverage from the threat to deploy a weapon system through actual deployment to the exercise of positive leverage to fully exploit the bargaining chip's potential. |
